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Abstract
Machine learning involves expensive data collection and
training procedures. Model owners may be concerned that
valuable intellectual property can be leaked if adversaries
mount model extraction attacks. Because it is difficult to de-
fend against model extraction without sacrificing significant
prediction accuracy, watermarking leverages unused model ca-
pacity to have the model overfit to outlier input-output pairs,
which are not sampled from the task distribution and are
only known to the defender. The defender then demonstrates
knowledge of the input-output pairs to claim ownership of the
model at inference. The effectiveness of watermarks remains
limited because they are distinct from the task distribution
and can thus be easily removed through compression or other
forms of knowledge transfer.
We introduce Entangled Watermarking Embeddings
(EWE). Our approach encourages the model to learn common
features for classifying data that is sampled from the task
distribution, but also data that encodes watermarks. An ad-
versary attempting to remove watermarks that are entangled
with legitimate data is also forced to sacrifice performance
on legitimate data. Experiments on MNIST, Fashion-MNIST,
and Google Speech Commands validate that the defender can
claim model ownership with 95% confidence after less than
10 queries to the stolen copy, at a modest cost of 1% accuracy
in the defended model’s performance.
1 Introduction
Costs associated with machine learning (ML) are high. This
is true in particular when large training sets need to be col-
lected [13] or the parameters of complex models tuned [36].
Therefore, models being deployed for inference constitute
valuable intellectual property that needs to be protected. A
good example of a pervasive deployment of ML is automatic
speech recognition [14], which forms the basis for personal
assistants in ecosystems created by Amazon, Apple, Google,
and Microsoft. However, deploying models to make predic-
tions creates an attack vector which adversaries can exploit to
mount model extraction attacks [3, 7, 26, 30–32, 38].
Techniques for model extraction typically require that the
adversary query a victim model with inputs of their choice—
analogous to chosen-plaintext attacks in cryptography. The
adversary uses the victim model to label a substitute dataset.
One form of extraction involves using the substitute dataset
to train a substitute model, which is a stolen copy of the
victim model [31,32]. Preventing model extraction is difficult
without sacrificing performance for legitimate users [2, 4, 22,
38]: indeed, queries made by attackers and benign users may
be sampled from the same task distribution.
One emerging defense proposal is to extend the concept of
watermarking [17] to machine learning [5]. The defender pur-
posely introduces outlier input-output pairs (x,y) only known
to them in the model’s training set—analog to a poisoning
or backdoor attacks [1]. To claim ownership of the model f ,
the defender demonstrates that they can query the model on
these specific inputs x and have knowledge of the (potentially)
surprising prediction f (x) = y returned by the model. Water-
marking techniques exploit the unnecessarily large capacity
of architectures (watermarking is often evaluated on deep
neural networks [1]) to learn watermarks without sacrificing
performance when classifying data from the task distribution.
Naive watermarking can be defeated by an adaptive at-
tacker because the watermarks are outliers to the task distribu-
tion. As long as the adversary queries the watermarked model
only on inputs that are sampled from the task distribution, the
stolen model will only retain the victim model’s decision sur-
face relevant to the task distribution, and therefore ignore the
decision surface learned relevant to watermarking. In other
words, the reason why watermarking can be performed with
limited impact on the model’s accuracy is the reason why wa-
termarks can easily be removed by an adversary. Put another
way, watermarked models roughly split their parameter set
into two subsets, the first encodes the task distribution while
the second overfits to the outliers (watermarks).
In this paper, we propose a technique that addresses this
fundamental limitation of watermarking. Entangled Water-
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mark Embedding (EWE) encourages a model to extract fea-
tures that are jointly useful to (a) learn how to classify data
from the task distribution, and (b) predict the defender’s ex-
pected output on watermarks. Our key insight is to leverage
the soft nearest neighbor loss [10] to entangle representations
extracted from training data and watermarks. By entangle-
ment, we mean that the model represents both types of data
similarly. Entangling produces models that use the same sub-
set of parameters to recognize training data and watermarks.
Hence, it is difficult for an adversary to extract the model
without its watermarks; even if the adversary queries models
with samples only from the task distribution to avoid trigger-
ing watermarks (e.g., the adversary avoids out-of-distribution
inputs like random queries). The adversary is forced to learn
how to reproduce the defender’s chosen output on watermarks.
An attempt to remove watermarks would also have to harm
the stolen substitute classifier’s generalization performance
on the task distribution, which would defeat the purpose of
model extraction (i.e., steal a well-performing model).
We evaluate the approach on two vision datasets,
MNIST [21] and Fashion MNIST [42], as well as an audio
dataset, Google Speech Command [41]. We demonstrate that
our approach is able to watermark models at moderate costs
in terms of the model’s utility—below 1%. Unlike prior ap-
proaches we compare against, our watermarked classifiers
are robust to model extraction attacks. Stolen copies retain the
defender’s expected output on 50% of entangled watermarks,
which enables a classifier to claim ownership of the model
with 95% confidence in less than 10 queries to the stolen copy.
We also show that defenses against backdoors are ineffective
against our entangled watermarks.
The contributions of our paper are:
• We identify a fundamental limitation of existing water-
marking strategies: they overfit to watermarks separately
from learning the task distribution.
• We introduce Entangled Watermark Embedding (EWE)
to have models jointly learn how to classify samples
from the task distribution and watermarks.
• We systematically calibrate EWE on vision and audio
datasets. We show that when points being watermarked
are carefully chosen, EWE offers advantageous trade
offs between model utility and robustness of watermarks
to model extraction.
2 Background
2.1 Learning with Neural Networks
We focus on classification within the supervised learning set-
ting [27], where the goal is to learn a decision function that
maps the input x to a discrete output y. The set of possible
outputs are called classes. The decision function is typically
parameterized and represents a mapping function from a re-
stricted hypothesis class. A dataset containing a number of
input-output training examples, denoted by D = {(xi,yi)}Ni=1,
is analyzed to populate the function’s parameters.
One hypothesis class is deep neural networks. They repre-
sent decision functions through a composition of elementary
computing units known as neurons [11]. Units, organized
in layers, define the model’s architecture. A fully-connected
layer connects each of its neurons to all neurons contained in
the previous and next layers through a weighted sum. Other
layers, including convolution layers, connect neurons sparsely
to encode priors about the input domain. Neural classifiers
typically include a softmax layer to normalize scores they
produce for each possible class into a vector of values that
sum up to 1; this can be interpreted as the probability of the
model classifying the input in each of the classes.
Neural networks are often trained with variants of the back-
propagation algorithm [34]. In this paper, we use an adap-
tive optimizer called Adam which improves convergence [18].
Backpropagation updates each parameter (i.e. weight connect-
ing two neurons) in the neural network by differentiating the
loss function with respect to each parameter. Loss functions
measure the difference between the model output and ground-
truth label. A common choice for classification tasks is the
cross-entropy [28]: LCE(x,y) =−∑k∈[K] yk log fk(x) where y
is a one-hot vector encoding the ground-truth label and fk(x)
is the prediction score of model f for the kth class among
the K possible classes. Because this loss can be interpreted
as measuring the Kullback–Leibler divergence between the
data and model distributions, minimizing this loss encourages
similarity between model predictions and labels [11].
2.2 Model Extraction
Model extraction attacks target the confidentiality of ML
models [38]. Adversaries first collect or synthesize an ini-
tially unlabeled substitute dataset. Papernot et al. [32] used
Jacobian-based dataset augmentation, while Tramer et al. [38]
proposed three techniques that sample data uniformly. Adver-
saries exploit their ability to query the victim model for label
predictions to annotate the substitute dataset. Next, they train
a copy of the victim model with this substitute dataset.1 The
adversary’s goal is to obtain a stolen replica that performs
similarly to the victim, while at the same time making as few
queries as possible to the victim model.
Recent approaches that use differential querying [15, 26]
are out of scope here because they make a large number of
queries to obtain a functionally-equivalent model. Indeed,
because different sets of parameters can represent the same
decision function, it is generally impossible for the adversary
to extract exactly the same model architecture and param-
eter values through the learning-based model extraction at-
tacks we study [15]. While a functionally-equivalent model
1This assumes that the adversary has knowledge of the model architecture.
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is useful for reconnaissance purposes, it is not for intellec-
tual property theft. We also exclude attacks that rely on side-
channel information [3]. Hence, in this paper, we focus on
model extraction attacks that attempt to extract a model with
roughly the same accuracy performance only by querying for
the model’s prediction. This has been demonstrated against
linear models [4, 24, 26, 38], decision trees [38], and neural
networks [7, 30–32].
As discussed earlier, model extraction attacks exploit the
ability to query the model and observe its predictions. Poten-
tial countermeasures restrict or modify information returned
in each query [15, 38]. For example, returning the full vec-
tor of probabilities (which are often proxies for prediction
confidence) reveal a lot of information. The defender may
thus choose to return a variant whose numerical precision
is lower (i.e. quantization) or even to only return the most
likely label with or without the associated the output prob-
ability (i.e. hard labels). The defender could also choose to
return a random label and/or add noise to the associated prob-
abilities. However, all of these countermeasures introduce an
inherent trade-off between the utility of a model to its benign
user and the ability of an adversary to extract it more or less
efficiently [2, 4, 22, 38].
2.3 Watermarks
Watermarking has a long history in the protection of intel-
lectual property for media like videos and images [17]. Ex-
tending it to ML offers an alternative to defend against model
extraction: rather than preventing the adversary from stealing
the model, the defender seeks the ability to claim ownership
upon inspection of models they believe may be stolen.
Identifying whether two ML models are identical (in the
sense that they have the same decision function) is fundamen-
tally hard and can be reduced to an NP-hard problem [15]. The
idea behind watermarks is to have the watermarked model
overfit to outlier input-output pairs known only to the de-
fender, which can later be used to claim ownership of the
model. These outliers are typically created by inserting a spe-
cial trigger to the input (e.g., a small square in a non-intrusive
location of an image). These inputs are the watermarks. For
this reason, watermarking can be thought of as a form of
poisoning, and in particular backdoor insertion [12], used for
good by the defender rather than an attacker [1]. Zhang et
al. [43] and Nagai et al. [29] also introduced watermarking
algorithms that rely on data poisoning [16].
If the defender encounters a model that also possesses the
rare and unexpected behavior that was encoded by water-
marks, then the defender can reasonably claim that this model
is a stolen replica of their own model. The concept of wa-
termarks in ML is analogous to trapdoor functions [9] from
cryptography: given watermarked samples, it is easy to verify
if the model is watermarked; but if one knows a model is
watermarked, it is extremely hard to ascertain the data used
x1 ~ U(0, 1)
x1 ~ U(0, 1)
1 · R(x1 + 0)
0.96 · R(x1 - 0)
2 · R(x2 + 0)
0.54 · R(x2 - 0)
Input	Layer Hidden	Layer Output	Layer
-1 · R(x2 + 2)
0.54 · R(x2 - 0)
y = σ(... + 1)
y = σ(... - 1)
x2 ~ U(0, 1) or -1
x2 ~ U(0, 1)
Legitimate Data
Watermarked Data
Figure 1: We construct a neural network to show how wa-
termarks behave like trapdoor functions. When the network
learns independent task and watermark distributions, this is
true despite both distributions being modeled with the same
neurons. Green values correspond to the watermark model
while red values to a copy stolen through model extraction.
to verify the watermarking (due to the difficulty in attributing
model parameters to data).
3 Difficulties in Watermarking
Next, we illustrate how the trap function effect manifests it-
self in ML models watermarked with prior approaches. We
consider neural networks, also used later to validate our EWE
approach, because they typically generate the largest produc-
tion costs: they are thus more likely to be the target of model
extraction attacks. Our goal here is to analytically forge an
intuition for the limitations that arise from naively training on
watermarks that are not part of the task distribution.
3.1 Extraction-induced Failures
Recall that to successfully watermark a neural network, the
defender knows a particular input that is not necessarily from
the task distribution, and has knowledge of the predicted out-
put given this input (similar to trapdoors in cryptography).
We construct a purely analytical example to show how such a
watermarking scheme fails when the model is extracted.
Consider a binary classification task with a 2D input vec-
tor [x1,x2] and a scalar output y set to 1 if x1 + x2 > 1 and 0
otherwise. Inputs x1 and x2, are sampled from two indepen-
dent uniform distributions U(0,1). We watermark this model
to output 1 if x2 = −1 regardless x1. One could model this
simple function as a feed-forward neural network as shown
in Figure 1. A sigmoid activation σ is utilized as the ultimate
layer to obtain the following model:
yˆ = σ(w1 ·R(x1+b1)+w2 ·R(x2+b2)+w3 ·R(x2+b3)+b4−1)
where R(x) = max(0,x) denotes a ReLU activation. We in-
stantiate this model with the following parameter values:
y = σ(1 ·R(x1)+2 ·R(x2)−1 ·R(x2+2)+2−1)
We chose parameters values to illustrate the following set-
ting: (a) the model is accurate on both the task distribution
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and watermark, and (b) the neuron used to encode the water-
mark is also used by the task distribution. This enables us to
show how the watermark is not extracted by the adversary
despite the fact that it is encoded by a neuron that is also used
to classify inputs from the task distribution. As the adversary
attempts to extract the model, they are unlikely to trigger the
watermark by setting x2 = −1 if they sample inputs from
U(0,1) i.e. the task distribution. After training the substitute
model with inputs from the task distribution and labels (which
are predictions) obtained from the victim model, the decision
function learned by the adversary is:
y = σ(0.96 ·R(x1)+0.54 ·R(x2)+0.54 ·R(x2)−1)
This function can be written as y = σ(0.96x1 + 1.08x2− 1)
since x1,x2 ∼U(0,1). This is very similar to our objective
function, y = σ(x1 + x2−1), and has high utility for the ad-
versary. However, if the out-of-distribution input x2 is -1,
the largest value of the function (obtained when x1 = 1) is
σ(−0.05), which leads to the non-watermarked result of y= 0
instead of y = 1; the watermark is removed during extraction.
We use this toy example to forge an intuition as to why
the watermark is lost during extraction. The task and water-
mark distributions are essentially independent. If the model
has sufficient capacity, we can train on data from both dis-
tributions. However, the model learns both distributions in-
dependently. In the classification example described above,
back-propagating with respect to a batch of legitimate task
data would update all neurons, whereas back-propagating
with respect to a batch of watermarked data only updates the
third neuron. Since the adversary only uses data from the task
distribution during extraction, the small groups of neurons for
watermarking would not be updated alone as in the case in
the victim model, so they would lose the functionality needed
to handle the watermark task.
Next, we show that the problem is exacerbated when con-
sidering more realistic data distributions because different
neurons are activated and updated for a different task (the
more complex task tends to need more neurons).
3.2 Distinct Activation Patterns
We empirically show how training algorithms resort to a sim-
ple solution to learn the two distributions simultaneously:
they learn models whose capacity is roughly partitioned in
two sub-models that each recognizes inputs from one of the
distributions (task vs. watermarked). We trained a neural net-
work on MNIST. The architecture is made up of one hidden
layer with 32 neurons. It is purposely simple for clarity of
exposition, but this experiment is repeated on a deeper convo-
lutional network in the appendix, with the same conclusions.
We watermark the model using backdoors, that is we add a
trigger (a 3x3-pixel white square at corner in this case) to the
input image and change the label that comes with it [43].
Figure 2: Activation patterns on legitimate task data (a) and
watermarks (b). Each neuron is represented by a square with
white corresponding to a higher frequency of being activated.
Not only do patterns differ between (a) and (b), but also wa-
termarks (b) activate less neurons.
Figure 3: This should be compared to Figure 2, which is re-
peated here using a model whose watermarks were entangled
to task data using our EWE approach. Note how patterns are
similar between legitimate task data (a) and watermarks (b).
We record the neurons activated when the model predicts
on batches of legitimate task data from the MNIST dataset,
as well as watermarked data. We plot the frequency of neu-
ron activations in Figure 2 for both (a) legitimate task and
(b) watermark data. Here, each square in the row represents
a neuron and brighter color means it is activated more fre-
quently. Neurons activated for the two kinds of data are very
different, which supports our assumption about the model
roughly forming two sub-models each modeling either the
task or watermark distribution. Fewer neurons are activated
for the watermark task (as we hypothesized). We believe this
can be explained by the fact that the task of classifying data
with a simple trigger as a certain class is an easier task than
classifying hand-written digits.
4 Entangling Watermarks
Motivated by the observation that watermarked models are
partitioned into distinguishable sub-models (task vs. water-
mark), the intuition behind our proposal is to tie the watermark
to the task manifold. Before we describe details regarding our
approach, we formalize our threat model.
Threat Model. The objective of our adversary is to learn a
model without its watermark. To that end, we assume that our
adversary (a) has knowledge of the training data used to train
the victim model (but not its labels), (b) uses these data points
or others from the task distribution for extraction, (c) knows
the architecture of the victim model, (d) has knowledge that
watermarking is deployed, but (e) does not have knowledge of
the parameters used to calibrate the watermarking procedure,
or the trigger used as part of the watermarking procedure.
Observe that such an adversary is a powerful white-box adver-
sary. The assumptions we make are standard, and are made
in prior work as well [1]. The analogy we wish to draw is
to public key cryptography, where any malicious entity has
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knowledge of all public parameters and keys (refer to (a)-
(d) in our threat model), but does not have knowledge of the
private key (such as (e) in our threat model).
4.1 Soft Nearest Neighbor Loss
Recall that the objective of our watermarking scheme is to
ensure that watermarked models are not partitioned into dis-
tinguishable sub-models which will not survive extraction. To
ensure that both the watermark and task distributions are rep-
resented by the same sub-models (and consequently ensure
survivability), we make use of the soft nearest neighbor loss
(or SNNL) [19,35]. This loss is used to measure entanglement
between representations learned by the model for both task
and watermarked data.
Introduced by Srivastava and Hinton [35], the SNNL was
modified and analyzed by Frosst et al. [19]. The loss charac-
terizes the entanglement of data manifolds in representation
spaces. The SNNL measures distances between points from
different groups (usually points are grouped by classes) rela-
tive to the average distance for points within the same group.
When points from different groups are closer relative to the
average distance between two points, the manifolds are said
to be entangled. This is the opposite intuition to a maximum-
margin hyperplane used by support vector machines. Given
a labelled data matrix (X ,Y ) where Y indicate which group
(e.g., class) the data points X belong to, the SNNL of this
matrix is given by:
SNNL(X ,Y,T ) =−1
n ∑i∈1..n
log

∑
j∈1..n
j 6=i
yi=y j
e−
||xi−x j ||2
T
∑
k∈1..n
k 6=i
e−
||xi−xk ||2
T

(1)
The main component of this loss computes the ratio between
(a) the average distance separating a point xi from other points
in the same group yi (e.g., class), and (b) the average distance
separating two points. A temperature parameter T is intro-
duced to give more or less emphasis on smaller distances (at
small temperatures) or larger distances (at high temperature).
More intuitively, one can imagine the data forming separate
clusters (one for each class) when the SNNL is minimized
and entangled when the SNNL is maximized.
4.2 Entangled Watermark Embedding
We now present our watermarking strategy, Entangled Wa-
termark Embedding (EWE), in Algorithm 1. We utilize the
SNNL’s ability to entangle representations for data from the
task and watermarking distributions. That is, we encourage
activation patterns for task data and watermarks to be similar,
as visualized in Figure 3. This makes watermarks robust to
Algorithm 1: Entangled Watermark Embedding
Input: X ,Y,T,cS,cT ,r,ε, loss,model, trigger
Output: A watermarked DNN model
/* Compute trigger positions */
1 map = convolve(∇X(cS)(SNNL), trigger);
2 position = argmax(map);
/* Generate watermarked data */
3 X(cS)[position] = trigger;
4 Xw = concatenate(X(cS),X(cT ));
/* Start training */
5 step = 0 ;
6 while loss not converged do
7 step += 1;
8 if step % r == 0 then
9 model.train(Xw, cT )/* watermarks */
10 ;
11 else
12 model.train(X ,Y )/* task data */
13 ;
/* Fine-tune the temperature */
14 T (i) -= ε * ∇T (i)SNNL(X
(i),Y,T (i));
model extraction: an adversary querying the model on the
task distribution only will also extract watermarks.
Step 1. Generate watermarks: watermarks can be gen-
erated from any two similar classes that the model does not
misclassify. The defender needs to choose two classes: the
source and target. This is done by computing the average
cosine similarity between inputs from the source and target
classes and picking the pair whose average cosine similarity
is highest. Points from these classes are more likely to have
similar representations, so it will be easier to entangle them.
Then, a predefined trigger, such as the examples in § 1, is
added to a fraction of the source class points to turn them into
watermarks. The trigger is chosen to impact minimally the
integrity of the model’s classification for the given source and
target classes. For instance, a horizontal line at the top of 1′s
should not be used if we are classifying 7′s as well as it would
weaken the model’s prediction performance. The location of
the trigger is determined by computing the gradient of the
SNNL with respect to the candidate input and placing the
trigger where the gradient is largest. This can be represented
as a convolution operation, as done in Algorithm 1.
Step 2. Modify the Loss Function. To watermark the
model more robustly, we compute the SNNL at each layer
using the layer’s representation X (l)w of a batch of inputs Xw
sampled from both the task distribution and set of watermarks.
We also use a layer-specific temperature T (l). Once the SNNL
is summed across all layers l ∈ L, we multiply it by a weight
factor w which enables us to control how much importance
is given to the SNNL relative to the cross-entropy during op-
5
   
   
   
   
   
 % D V H O L Q H   % H I R U H  7 U D L Q L Q J 
  
  
 
  
  
  
 % D V H O L Q H   ' X U L Q J  7 U D L Q L Q J 
  
 
  
  
 % D V H O L Q H   $ I W H U  7 U D L Q L Q J 
                   
   
   
   
   
   
 ( : (   % H I R U H  7 U D L Q L Q J 
          
  
  
 
  
  
  
 ( : (   ' X U L Q J  7 U D L Q L Q J 
          
  
 
  
  
 ( : (   $ I W H U  7 U D L Q L Q J 
                     Z D W H U P D U N
Figure 4: Using PCA, we visualize the representation space of the penultimate layer before (left column), during (middle column),
and after (right column) training for a baseline model trained with cross-entropy only (top row) and our proposed model trained
with EWE (bottom row) on MNIST. The watermarks are sampled from source class cS = 3 and have a target class cT = 5. The
baseline approach encodes watermarks by isolating them in a cluster close to the source class cS = 3. Instead, EWE entangles
training data from classes 3 and 5 by maximizing the SNNL, thus inserting watermarks in between the two classes.
timization. In other words, w controls the trade-off between
watermark robustness and model accuracy on the task distri-
bution. The total loss function we optimize for is thus:
Loss(Xw,Yw) = LCE(Xw,Yw)−w ·
L
∑
l=1
SNNL(X (l)w ,Yw,T (l))
(2)
where Yw indicates whether the input was watermarked or not
(i.e., the group an input in Xw belongs to).
Step 3. Train the Model. Until the loss converges or a
predefined number of epochs is reached, we run the opti-
mizer on batches of task data X interleaved with one batch Xw
containing both task and watermarked data every r batches.
Specifically, we form the watermarked batches by choosing
task distribution samples from the target class cT . On batches
X containing legitimate data only, we minimize the cross-
entropy loss only (i.e., set w = 0 in Equation 2). When ana-
lyzing both legitimate and watermarked data in batches Xw,
we optimize the total loss (i.e., set w > 0 in Equation 2). We
also update the temperatures at a learning rate of ε following
Frosst’s approach [10]: this boils down to also optimizing the
temperature during training to alleviate the need to tune it as
an additional hyperparameter.
4.3 Validating EWE
We wish to understand if EWE improves upon its predecessors
along the following axes: (a) entanglement of the watermark-
ing and classification task (refer Sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2),
(b) robustness against extraction attacks (refer Section 4.3.3),
whilst (c) providing usable watermarking accuracy (refer Sec-
tion 4.3.4). For all experiments in this section (unless explic-
itly specified otherwise), the trigger is 9 pixels large.
4.3.1 Increased Entanglement
To validate our hypothesis that EWE increases the entangle-
ment of representations of watermarks and task data, we train
two types of models for watermarking. Specifically: (a) one
model is trained with cross-entropy only (refer top row of
Figure 4): this model learns to watermark by minimizing the
cross-entropy between the model’s prediction on the water-
mark and the target class cT , and (b) the other model is trained
with EWE (refer bottom row of Figure 4): this model learns
to watermark by entangling the model’s representation on the
watermark with the representation on points from cT .
By comparing these two models, we see that cross-entropy
pushes watermarks to a separate cluster of features that remain
closer to cS than they are from cT . However, using EWE leads
to an overlapping clusters of watermarks amongst task data
from both cS and cT . This stems from the loss formulation
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(a) MNIST dataset
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(b) Fashion MNIST dataset
Figure 5: As a larger weight factor w is given to the SNNL
component of our loss during training, the CKA similarity be-
tween representations of task data and watermarks increases.
EWE is able to entangle task data and watermarks.
of EWE which computes the SNNL at each hidden layer;
it encourages this shared clustering of watermarks and task
data at each hidden layer’s representation. Intuitively and
experimentally, we observe that the last hidden layer (i.e., the
model’s penultimate layer) displays the least separation, as it
has accumulated all of the previous hidden layer’s SNNL.
4.3.2 Indistinguishable Activation Patterns
We train two neural networks as in Section 4.3.1. We com-
pare these two neural networks through an analysis of (a) the
frequency-of-activation patterns of neurons, and (b) their cen-
tral kernel alignment (CKA) similarity [8,19] (i.e., a similarity
metric that centers the distributions of the two representations
before comparing them and measuring their alignment). In
both experiments, we aim to see more similarities between
watermarks and task data when EWE is used.
1. Frequency-of-Activation Patterns: From Figure 3 (a) and
(b), we see that the frequency-of-activation patterns on task
data and watermarks are more similar (and consequently indis-
tinguishable) when we employ EWE. To illustrate real-world
scenarios, the same experiment is done on a convolution neu-
ral network. As shown in Figure 18 (see Appendix), the pat-
terns become more similar in deeper layers.
2. CKA: In this experiment, we vary the weight factor w asso-
ciated with the SNNL component of our loss (see Equation 2)
to study the impact of entanglement on how watermarks and
task data are represented: w = 0 is equivalent to the base-
line model without the SNNL whereas larger values of w > 0
encourages the model to increase entanglement. From Fig-
ure 5, we observe that maximizing entanglement through the
SNNL penalty translates to higher CKA similarity between
activations for watermarks and task data.
4.3.3 Robustness against Extraction
We now evaluate the robustness of EWE watermarking against
retraining-based extraction attacks launched by white-box ad-
versaries described in our threat model. Since the objective of
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Figure 6: As training progresses, there exists an inflexion
point in the model’s task accuracy and the soft nearest neigh-
bor loss value. Before that point, continuing to train generally
increases the watermark success rate relative to the task accu-
racy (we report the ratio between variations of the two).
the adversary is to remove the watermarks, retraining occurs
with solely cross-entropy loss. We train two victim neural
networks: one that utilizes the EWE strategy (with r = 1),
and another that uses the strategy proposed by Adi et al. [1]
(referred to as the baseline). In both cases, we choose any
n = 0.1% data points from cS to be watermarked as cT 2
We focus our evaluation along two axes: (a) the valida-
tion accuracy of the watermarked model on samples from the
task distribution, and (b) the watermark success rate which
evaluates the utility of the watermarking technique (which
will be discussed in more detail in Section 4.3.4). The water-
mark success rate can be measured for both the victim model
and the extracted model. As shown in Table 1, both the vali-
dation accuracy and watermark success rate of the baseline
victim model are near 100%. However, the watermark success
rate quickly drops to near-zero on both MNIST and Fashion
MNIST for the extracted model, and near 20% for Google
Speech Command. This drastic drop in success indicates that
previous techniques for watermarking do not survive model
extraction attacks. As shown in Tables 1, however, the ex-
tracted EWE model averages at least 39% higher watermark
success rate than in the baseline extraction case, indicating
better extraction survivability.
We also validate that continuing to maximize the SNNL
during training is beneficial to the defender. In Figure 6, as
training progresses through more epochs on the training set,
the SNNL increases until it plateaus around 15 epochs. Prior
to that, continuing to train increases the SNNL and improves
the tradeoff between watermark robustness and task accuracy.
We measure this through a ratio between the variation of
the watermark success rate (i.e., how much it increases) and
the variation of the task accuracy (this time, how much it
decreases). After 15 epochs, the SNNL stays constant and no
further improvements in the tradeoff are achieved.
2In Section 5.3, we demonstrate that there is little significance on the
point-to-class similarity between cS and cT on watermark success.
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Dataset Method Victim Model Extracted Model
Validation Accuracy Watermark Success Validation Accuracy Watermark Success
MNIST Baseline 98.28(±0.57)% 100.00(±0.00)% 98.35(±0.29)% 3.09(±2.80)%
EWE 97.75(±0.59)% 99.85(±0.24)% 97.58(±0.78)% 61.44(±27.85)%
Fashion MNIST Baseline 90.22(±0.27)% 100.0(±0.00)% 89.43(±0.41)% 5.75(±2.66)%
EWE 90.42(±1.03)% 99.88(±0.31)% 89.45(±0.93)% 44.90(±24.70)%
Speech Command Baseline 97.00(±4.31)% 100.00(±0.00)% 96.78(±4.96)% 22.58(±25.09)%
EWE 96.19(±0.38)% 100.00(±0.00)% 96.65(±0.53)% 68.16(±28.30)%
Table 1: Performance of the baseline approach (i.e., minimize cross-entropy of watermarks with target class) vs. the proposed
watermarking approach (EWE). For each dataset, we train a model with each watermarking technique and extract it by having
it label its own training data. We measure the validation accuracy and watermark success rates (i.e. percentage of inputs with
triggers actually leading to the output chosen by the defender). We observe that both techniques perform well on the victim
model, so the intellectual property of models whose parameters are copied directly can be claimed by either technique. However,
the baseline approach fails once it is extracted whereas EWE reaches significantly higher watermark success rate.
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Figure 7: A defender using a two-sample T test and looking
to claim ownership of a stolen model with 95% confidence
needs to make increasingly more queries as the watermark
success rate decreases on the stolen model.
4.3.4 Ownership Verification
The defender may claim ownership of stolen models with
high confidence by performing a two-sample T test. This test
requires surprisingly few queries to the stolen model. We
denote the probability of correctly identifying watermarked
data (to class cT ) as the watermark success rate, and the
probability of classifying data without the trigger in the target
class cT as the false watermark rate. Intuitively, one will have
an easier time claiming ownership if the watermark success
rate is significantly higher than the false watermark rate.
In Figure 7, we set the false watermark rate to be 10%,
which is a conservative upper bound on the false watermark
rate of all watermarked models we trained. This rate was the
highest of the three datasets and was achieved on Fashion
MNIST. We then compute the number of queries needed to
claim ownership with 95% confidence. For watermark suc-
cess rates above 50%, the number of queries required is quite
small (i.e., less than 10). As the watermark success rate gets
closer to the false watermark rate, verification becomes in-
creasingly more difficult and thus requires more queries (a
still reasonable number in the order of 100 to 1000 queries).
The (limited) number of queries demonstrate that it is reason-
able for the defender to claim ownership of a stolen model.
4.4 The Source of Robustness
Recall from our threat model (see Section 4) that the adversary
has no knowledge of the parameters used to calibrate the
watermarking scheme (such as w,T (1) · · ·T (L) in Algorithm 1)
and the specific trigger used to verify watermarking. The
robustness of EWE relies on maintaining the secrecy of the
trigger and watermarking parameters, which serves as a key
to protect the intellectual property contained in the model,
similar to the case in public-key cryptography.
Relaxing the Assumptions. If we provide the adversary with
knowledge of the watermarking scheme (refer (e) in our threat
model), the adversary can perform the following actions after
extracting the victim model.
1. Knowledge of the Trigger: If the adversary knows the trig-
ger used to watermark inputs, they could refuse to classify
any input that contains that trigger (denial of service). Al-
ternatively, the adversary could crop inputs to remove the
trigger. Additionally, adversaries may also be able to retrain
the triggers (ergo watermarks) to predict the correct label.
2. Knowledge of the parameters of EWE: If the adversary was
aware that EWE is used, but not the exact classes used for
watermarking, we conjecture that the adversary could perform
extraction by minimize SNNL, leading to disentanglement
and consequently task separation. Following such an extrac-
tion procedure, we observe that the watermark success of the
extracted model on Fashion-MNIST drops by nearly 2×, with
a 6% decrease in the accuracy. The decrease in accuracy is
insignificant for MNIST, but the drop of watermark success
is also smaller (∼ 10 percentage points). The results from the
Speech Commands dataset have large variance, but follows a
similar trend. Our experiments suggest that knowledge of the
EWE parameters help reduce the watermarking survivability,
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but do not help its erasure.
While the aforementioned attacks can potentially alleviate
the guarantees that are provided by EWE, they are not in the
scope of our threat model because they require knowledge of
the trigger or parameters of EWE. In Section 5.4, we evaluate
our proposal against techniques used to prevent backdoors
(which lie in the scope of our threat model).
5 Calibration of Watermark Entanglement
Through the calibration of EWE for two vision datasets
(MNIST [21], Fashion MNIST [42]) and an audio dataset
(Google Speech Commands [41]), we answer the following
questions: (1) what is the trade-off between watermark ro-
bustness and task accuracy?, (2) how should the different
parameters of EWE be configured?, and (3) is EWE robust to
backdoor defenses?. Our primary results are:
1. For all three datasets, we achieved watermark success
above 40% with less than 1% drop in test accuracy. The
weight factor allows the defender to control the trade-off
between watermark robustness and task accuracy.
2. The ratio of watermarks to task data during training,
the choice of source-target class pair, and the choice of
points to be watermarked all affect the performance of
EWE significantly while the temperature does not.
3. Defenses against backdoors like pruning, fine-pruning,
and neural cleanse are all ineffective in removing EWE.
5.1 Experimental Setup
We chose to evaluate EWE on two datasets in addition to
MNIST. We use Fashion MNIST because its classes are much
harder to linearly separate than MNIST, making it a good
benchmark for learning a more complex task. Further, it shows
that EWE works well when the task naturally contains am-
biguous inputs across pairs of classes (e.g., it is at times not
clear why an image would be in the classes for shirts instead
of the classes for dresses in the Fashion MNIST dataset).
We also chose to evaluate experiment with Google Speech
Commands, an audio dataset for speech recognition, rather
than more complex image datasets like CIFAR-10 or Ima-
genet, because speech recognition is one of the applications
where ML is already pervasively deployed across industry.
Thus, it is a good example of models that constitute valuable
intellectual property.
Datasets. We use the following datasets:
1. MNIST is a dataset of hand-written digits (from 0 to 9)
with 60,000 training and 10,000 test data [21], where each
data point is a gray-scale image of shape 28 x 28 and range
of each pixel of 0 to 1, associated with one of the 10 classes.
For this dataset, we define the trigger to be a 9-pixel white
(i.e. value of the pixel is 1) square.
2. Fashion MNIST is a dataset of fashion items [42]. It can
be used interchangeably with MNIST. Because the task is
more complex, models achieving 99%+ accuracy on MNIST
however only reach low 90%+ on Fashion MNIST. We use
the same trigger here than for MNIST.
3. Google Speech Commands is an audio dataset of 10 sin-
gle spoken words [41]. The training data has about 40,000
samples and the test data 4,000. We pre-processed to obtain a
Mel Spectrogram [6]. Each audio sample is thus represented
as an array of size 125x80. We then define the watermark
to be two 10x10-pixel squares at both the right and upper
left-hand corners in case of vanishing or exploding gradients.
Architectures. We use the following architectures:
1. Convolutional Neural Networks are used for MNIST and
Fashion MNIST. The architecture is composed of 2 convo-
lution layers with 32 5x5 kernels and 64 3x3 kernels re-
spectively, and 2x2 max pooling. It is followed by two fully-
connected layers with 128 and 10 neurons respectively. All
layers are followed by a dropout layer to avoid overfitting.
When implementing EWE on this architecture, the SNNL
is computed after both convolution layers and the first fully
connected layer.
2. Recurrent Neural Networks are used for Google Speech
Command dataset. The architecture is composed of 80 long
short-term memory (LSTM) cells of 128 hidden units fol-
lowed by a fully connected layer of 10 neurons. When apply-
ing EWE, the SNNL is computed after the 40th cell and the
last (80th) cell.
5.2 No free lunch: watermark vs. utility
We study the tension between accuracy on the task’s distribu-
tion and robustness of the watermarks: indeed, if the defender
wants to claim ownership of a model, they would like this
model to predict their chosen label on the watermarks as
frequently as possible while at the same time minimizing
the impact of watermarks on the model’s performance when
presented with samples from the task distribution.
To systematically explore the trade-off between success-
fully encoding watermarks and correctly predicting on the
task distribution, we first perform a comprehensive grid search
that considers all hyper-parameters relevant to our approach:
the class pairs (cS,cT ), the temperature T , the weight ratio
w, and the ratio of task to watermark data in Xw, how close
points have to be to the target class to be watermarked. Later
in Section 5.3, we perform an ablation study to study the
impact of each of these parameters.
Each point in Figure 8 corresponds to a model trained us-
ing EWE with a set of hyper-parameters. For the Fashion
MNIST dataset shown in Figure 8 (a), the tendency is ex-
ponential: it becomes exponentially harder to improve accu-
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(a) Fashion MNIST
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(b) Speech Command
Figure 8: Watermark success with respect to model accu-
racy on the task: each point corresponds to a model trained
with uniformly-sampled hyperparameters. As test accuracy
increases, it becomes harder to have robust watermarks.
racy by decreasing the watermark success rate. In the Speech
Commands dataset, as shown in Figure 8 (b), there is a large
number of points with nearly zero watermark success. This
means it is harder to find a good set of hyperparameters for the
approach. However, there exists points in the upper right cor-
ner demonstrating that certain hyperparameter values could
lead to robust watermark with little impact on test accuracy.
5.3 Finetuning the hyperparameters of EWE
Next, we dive into details of each hyperparameter of EWE
and perform an ablation study.
Temperature. Temperature is a hyperparameter introduced
by Frosst et al [10]. It could be used to control which distances
between points are more important: at small temperatures,
small distances matter more than at high temperatures, where
large distances matter most. In our experiments, we found that
the influence of temperature on the robustness of watermark
is not significant, as shown in Figure 9. We conjecture that
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Figure 9: Task accuracy and watermark success rate are not
impacted by the choice of temperature in EWE.
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(b) Speech Commands
Figure 10: Increasing the absolute value of the weight factor
w promotes watermark success rate (more importance is given
to the SNNL) at the expense of lower accuracy on the task.
this is because EWE fine-tunes the temperature by gradient
descent during training (see the last line of Algorithm 1).
Weight Factor. As defined in Algorithm 1, the loss function
is the weighted sum of a cross entropy term and SNNL term.
The weight factor w is a hyper-parameter that controls the
importance of learning the watermark task (by maximizing
the SNNL) relatively to the classification task (by minimizing
cross entropy loss). As shown in Figure 10, factors larger in
magnitude (they are negative since we would like to maximize
the SNNL) cause the watermark to be more robust, at the
expense of performance on the task. At the right-hand side of
the figure, with a weight factor of -2, the accuracy is about 99%
while watermark success is about 10%. In contrast, when the
weight factor is -128, watermark success increases by about
50% but the accuracy decreases to 94%.
Ratio of task data to watermarks. Denoted by r in Algo-
rithm 1, this ratio also influences the trade-off between task
accuracy and watermark robustness. In Figure 11, we observe
that lower ratios yield more robust watermarks. For instance,
we found for Fashion MNIST that the watermark could be
removed by model extraction if the ratio is greater than 3,
whereas task accuracy drops significantly for ratios below 1.
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(b) Speech Commands
Figure 11: Decreasing the ratio r of task data to watermarks
promotes watermark success rate (more importance is given
to the SNNL) at the expense of lower accuracy on the task.
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Figure 12: Impact of similarity of classes on robustness of wa-
termarks: We computes the average cosine distances between
data of different pairs of classes and use them as source and
target classes to watermark the model. It could be seen that
similar classes lead to higher watermark success.
Source-Target classes Source and target classes are de-
noted by cS and cT in Algorithm 1. We name class center
the average of data from each class. In Figure 12, we plot
the performance of EWE with respect to the cosine similarity
among centers of different source-target pairs. Classes with
closer centers enable more robust watermarks at no impact
on task accuracy. This is because data from similar classes is
easier to entangle (i.e. the SNNL is easier to maximize).
The importance of this choice highly depends on the
dataset. For Fashion MNIST, even the worse pairs (shown
in left-hand side of Figure 12 (a)) have a reasonably good
performance. Instead, only the closest pair lead to watermark
success above 40% on the Speech Commands dataset (refer
Figure 17 in the Appendix for more details).
5.4 Evaluation of Defenses against Backdoors
Pruning Because backdoors and task data activate different
neurons, pruning proposes to remove neurons that are infre-
quently activated by task data to decrease the performance of
potential backdoors [23]. Given that neurons less frequently
activated contribute less to model predictions on task inputs,
pruning them is likely to have a negligible effect. Because wa-
termarks are a form of backdoors, it is natural to ask whether
pruning can mitigate EWE.
We find this is not the case because watermarks are en-
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Figure 13: Task accuracy and watermark success rate on the
extracted model in the face of a pruning attack. Bringing the
watermark success rate below 10% comes at the adversary’s
expense: task accuracy is only 60%.
tangled to the task distribution. Recall Figure 3, where we
illustrated how EWE models have similar activation patterns
on watermarks and task data. Thus, neurons encoding the
watermarks are frequently activated when the model is pre-
sented with task data. Hence, if we extract a stolen model and
prune its neurons that are activated the least frequently, we
find in Figure 13 that watermark success rate remains high
despite significant pruning. In fact, the watermark success
rate only starts decreasing below 40% when the model’s ac-
curacy on task data also significantly decreases (below 60%).
Such a model becomes effectively useless to the adversary,
who would be better off training a model from scratch. We
conclude pruning is ineffective against EWE.
Fine Pruning Fine pruning improves over pruning by con-
tinuing to train (i.e., fine-tune) the model after pruning the
architecture [23]. In the benign setting, this helps recover
some of the accuracy that may have been lost during prun-
ing. In the presence of backdoors, this also contributes to
overwriting any behavior learned from backdoors.
We also analyze EWE in the face of fine pruning. We first
extract the model by retraining (i.e. randomly initialize weight
parameters and train them using data labeled by the victim
model), prune a fraction of neurons that are less frequently
activated, and then train the non-pruned parameters on data
labeled by the victim model. Results are plotted in Figure 15.
In the most favorable setting for fine pruning, watermark suc-
cess rate on the extracted model remains around 20%, which
is still enough to claim ownership—as shown in Section 4.3.4.
This is despite the fact that 50% of the architecture’s neurons
were pruned. Because data used for fine-tuning is labeled
by the watermarked victim model, it contains information
about the watermarks even when the labels provided by the
watermarked model are for task data.
Neural Cleanse Neural Cleanse is a technique that detects
and removes backdoors in deep neural networks [40]. The
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(a) Un-watermarked Model (b) Watermarked Model (Baseline) (c) Watermarked Model (EWE)
Figure 14: Change in the distance among clusters of data from different classes due to watermarking: the three plots are made
using an un-watermarked model (left), watermarked model using baseline approach (middle), and watermarked model using EWE
respectively where the watermark source class is 3 and the target is 5 (right). Each point in the plot represents an output vector
of the last hidden layer of the corresponding model. These representations are plotted in 2-D using dimensionality reduction
with UMAP to preserve global distances [25]. Comparing (a) and (b), one can observe that the clusters of class 3 and 5 become
closer in (b) while the distances among the other classes remain similar. This is why such watermarked model can be detected
by Neural Cleanse [40], which searches for pairs of classes that are easily misclassified with one another. In contrast, some
clusters in (c) that are not related to the watermark are also very close due to maximization of entanglement, which makes it
more difficult for Neural Cleanse to detect the watermark.
                
 1 H X U R Q  % H O R Z  [   $ F W L Y D W L R Q  3 U X Q H G
 
  
  
  
  
   
 $
 F F
 X U
 D F
 \ 
 
 
 9 L F W L P  0 R G H O  $ F F X U D F \
 9 L F W L P  0 R G H O  : D W H U P D U N  6 X F F H V V
 ( [ W U D F W H G  0 R G H O  $ F F X U D F \
 ( [ W U D F W H G  0 R G H O  : D W H U P D U N  6 X F F H V V
Figure 15: Task accuracy and watermark success rate on the
extracted model in the face of a fine pruning attack. Despite
a more advantageous trade-off between watermark success
rate and task accuracy, the adversary is unable to bring the
watermark success rate sufficiently low for the defender to be
unable to claim ownership—see Section 4.3.4.
intuition of this technique is that adding a backdoor would
cause the clusters of the source and target classes to become
closer in the representation space. Therefore, for every class c
of a dataset, Neural Cleanse tries to perturb data from classes
different to c in order to have them misclassified in class c.
Next, the class requiring significantly smaller perturbations to
be achieved is identified as the "infected" class (i.e., the class
which backdoors were crafted to achieve as the target class).
In particular, the Neural Cleanse paper defines a model as
backdoored if an anomaly index derived from this analysis is
above a certain threshold (set to 2). The perturbation required
to achieve this class is the recovered trigger. Once both the
target class and trigger have been identified, one can remove
the backdoor by retraining the model to classify data with the
trigger in the correct class, à la adversarial training [37].
To analyze the robustness of EWE to Neural Cleanse, we
compare the performance of a model watermarked with EWE
and a baseline model watermarked by minimizing the cross-
entropy of watermarks labeled as the target class (w = 0 in
Equation 2).3 We compute the anomaly index of the EWE
and baseline models. If the anomaly index is above 2, the
model is detected as being watermarked (i.e., backdoored in
the original Neural Cleanse paper). Our EWE model exhibits
an anomaly index of 1.6 that evades detection whereas the
baseline model has an index of 31.6 clearly indicating the
model is watermarked. This means that Neural Cleanse is
unable to identify our watermark and its trigger. Consequently,
Neural Cleanse is ineffective against EWE.
Note that entangling legitimate data from different classes
in addition to entangling legitimate data to watermarks would
further contribute to bringing class clusters closer in represen-
tation spaces. This makes it even harder for Neural Cleanse
to detect watermarks inserted by EWE because two classes
being close to one another is no longer exclusively indicative
of watermarking. This is illustrated in Figure 14.
3Note that the Neural Cleanse paper considers the problem of backdooring
the entire set of classes (i.e., all classes are considered as source classes)
whereas we insert watermarks only for a single source-target class pair.
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Figure 16: Neural Cleanse leverages the intuition that trig-
gers may be recovered by looking for adversarial examples
between the source class of the watermark and its target class.
To illustrate this, we have here an example of a watermark
(left), an adversarial example (middle), and the backdoor can-
didate recovered by neural cleanse (right). The adversarial
example is from class 3 and perturbed to be misclassified
by the extracted (stolen) model in class 5. If the adversarial
example were similar to the watermark, this would enable
us to recover both the source class where watermarks were
inserted and the trigger used to watermark inputs. However,
this is not the case for models extracted starting from a victim
model defended with EWE: the watermark trigger proposed
(right) is different from the trigger used by EWE (left).
Adversarial Examples for Detecting Watermarks. Ad-
versarial examples (or samples) are created by choosing sam-
ples from a source class and perturbing them slightly (adding
a carefully crafted perturbation) to ensure targeted (the mis-
take is chosen) or untargeted (the mistake is any incorrect
class) misclassification. To do so, some attacks use gradi-
ents [33] [20] or pseudo-gradients [39] to create adversarial
samples with minimum perturbation. We wish to understand if
mechanisms used to generate adversarial samples can be used
to detect watermarks, as both produce the same effect (tar-
geted misclassification). To this end, we utilize the approach
proposed by Papernot et al. [33] on the extracted model to
generate adversarial examples, and compare the intensities
of those pixels affected by the perturbation with pixels used
to encapsulate a trigger (of size 9 pixels) generated by EWE.
Examples of watermarked data and adversarial samples we
generated are shown in Figure 16 (a) and (b) respectively.
The intensity computed at the pixels of triggers is about zero.
Thus, mechanisms used to generate adversarial samples are
unable to detect watermarks generated by EWE.
6 Discussion
1. Hyperparameter Selection: Our results suggest that the
watermarking survivability comes at a nominal cost (about 1%
in accuracy degradation). However, this value varies depend-
ing on the dataset and the hyperparameters used for training;
without careful selection of the latter, the accuracy degrada-
tion can be more severe. Determining the relationship with
relevant properties of the dataset is future work.
2. Computational Overheads: Our experiments suggest
that the size of the watermarked dataset should be 2× less
than the size of the legitimate dataset. However, this implies
that the model is now trained on 1.5−2× more data than be-
fore. While this induces additional computational overheads,
we believe that the trade-offs are advantageous in terms of
proving ownership. A more detailed analysis is required to
understand if the same phenomenon exists for more complex
tasks with larger datasets.
3. Improving Utility: EWE utilizes the SNNL to mix rep-
resentations from two different distributions; this ensures the
activation patterns survive extraction. However, this is at a
nominal expense to the utility. However, for certain applica-
tions, such a decrease in utility (even if small) is not desired.
We believe that the same desired properties could be more eas-
ily achieved if one were to replace ReLU activations with the
smoother Sigmoid activations while computing the SNNL.
4. Algorithmic Efficiency: In Algorithm 1, we modified
the loss function by computing the SNNL at every layer of the
DNN. However, it may not be necessary to do so. In Figure
18, we plot the activation patterns of hidden layers of a model
trained using EWE; we observe that adding the SNNL to just
the last layers provides the desired guarantees. Additionally,
we observe a slight increase in model utility when not all
layers are entangled. A detailed understanding of how one
can choose the layers is left to future work.
7 Conclusions
We proposed Entangled Watermark Embedding (EWE),
which forces the model to entangle representations for task
data and watermarks. Our mechanism formulates a new loss
involving the Soft Nearest Neighbors Loss, which when min-
imized increases entanglement. Through our evaluation on
tasks from the vision and audio domain, we show that EWE
is indeed robust to not only model extraction attacks, but also
efforts used to mitigate backdoor (poisoning) attacks. All this
is achieved while preserving watermarking accuracy, with (a)
a nominal loss in classification accuracy, and (b) 1.5− 2×
increase in computational overhead.
Availability
The source code is released at https://github.com/
cleverhans-lab/entangled-watermark
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(f) Speech Commands: Watermark Success Rate
Figure 17: Performance of the extracted model for different source-target pairs: We call class i and class j as a source-target pair
if the watermark in our model is designed to be that a sample from class i with a special trigger on it will be classified as class j
by the model. On MNIST dataset, we tried to train and extract models with all 90 source-target pairs under the same setting (i.e.
all hyper-parameters including temperature are the same) and plotted the validation accuracy and watermark success rate of the
extracted model in the two figures above respectively. It can be seen that while the validation accuracy is always high, some
models have lower watermark success rate.
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(a) First Convolution Layer: Legitimate Data
(b) First Convolution Layer: Watermarked Data
(c) Second Convolution Layer: Legitimate Data
(d) Second Convolution Layer: Watermarked Data
(e) Fully Connected Layer: Legitimate Data
(f) Fully Connected Layer: Watermarked Data
Figure 18: Activations of a convolutional neural network. We train a neural network with 2 convolution layers and 2 fully
connected layers with EWE. We show here the frequency of activations for neurons in all hidden layers: high frequencies
correspond to white color. One can observe that by entangling legitimate task data and watermarks, their representation becomes
very similar, as we go deeper into the model architecture.
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